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Abstract: We interpret the recent Greek crisis from a fresh perspective. Although the 
widely held view is that, the Greek crisis was evident in the dim macroeconomic 
outlook and thus imminent and unavoidable, we suggest that the crisis was also 
unavoidable but for an entirely different set of reasons; namely the lack of consistent 
and coherent political development.   
Using Greece as an example, we draw upon empirical data to show that the political 
development attainment level is a critical component of nation branding and a root 
cause in the Greek crisis. We also support the view that, the lack of brand risk 
management techniques at the governance level was a key catalyst for the rapid 
escalation of what at first instance appears to be bad public financial practices and 
policy making, but is in essence lack of real political development. Thus, the Greek 
crisis should have been avoided. 
Keywords: Nation branding, Greek crisis, European Economic Crisis  
JEL classification codes : F55, F59 
1. INTRODUCTION & BACKGROUND 
The Greek crisis has dominated many of international news headlines since late 2009; in 
many ways it still is. The “jury” is still out on whether the Greek economy will default, or not.  
It is well known that the Greek economy, in May 2010 opted for a financing package totaling 
€110  billion,  under  the  “auspices”  of  the  International  Monetary  fund,  the  European 
Commission and the European Central Bank (e.g. PMO 2010, iMF Direct 2010). In line with 
the terms set within the financing program, Greece is undergoing an austere reform program 
in order to turn around the tide; the whole effort is about making Greece more competitive 
and, at the end of the day, capable to repay its debt successfully.  
Many  of  the  analyses  of  the  Greek  situation  focus,  almost  exclusively  on  the  dim 
macroeconomic  figures  and  the  now  infamous  “Greek  Statistics.”  Along  these  lines,  the 
macroeconomic  figures  regarding  public  spending,  debt,  and  the  “formidable”  size  of  the 
public sector are often considered as root causes of the Greek problem, which was set in 
motion  largely  by  the  worldwide  economic  crisis  that  followed  the  Lehman  Brothers’ 
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collapse, as investors got more and more cautious about their positions (e.g. Kouretas and 
Vlamis  2010).    For  a  macroeconomic  interpretation  of  the  Greek  see  also  European 
Commission (2010a).  
  A  comprehensive  reading  of  the  Greek  situation  is  more  likely  to  unveil  and 
subsequently debunk a number of myths including the following: 
￿  The Greek crisis has been the sole outcome of failed economic policies; 
￿  Greece has been characterized by political stability;  
￿  Political leadership maintains policy continuity and sustainability; 
￿  A strategic vision for the country’s development is being shared among ruling parties. 
￿  The Greek people have a shared vision, values and principles regarding competent 
economic and political development. 
These  myths  are,  in  essence,  related  to  political  development  attributes  that  are 
frequently taken for granted in developed economies, including the US, Japan, most EU and 
the  Euro  zone.    In  this case  however,  these  same  attributes  differentiate  Greece  from  its 
counterparts despite any similarities in deficits, debts or other dim macroeconomic figures.  
In this paper we set out to succinctly show that the Greek crisis is more complex than 
poor  public  finances  and  unsuccessful  fiscal  policies.    We  look  at  empirical  data 
corresponding to each of the myths and support the view that the Greek crisis is by and large a 
problem equivalent to that of a “dysfunctional” organization, namely one with, evidently, 
ineffective decision making and lack of a long(er) term vision. Or, when seen from a political 
science perspective, the Greek problem is typical of what Political Science researchers in the 
90s would have considered lack of Political development.  There are of course alternative and 
complementary interpretations (for instance, Sklias 2011; Sklias & Galatsidas 2010).  
2. THE GREEK CRISIS MYTHS  
We  thus  proceed  to  re-consider  the  current  Greek  crisis  from  a  fresh  perspective 
addressing one myth at a time. For each myth we identify one or more statistical indicators or 
relevant data that falsify (or not) the myth. Obviously the choice of indicators can be debated 
forever and a different set of indicators is likely to yield different results.  In order to illustrate 
our point, however, we focussed mostly on indicators that tend to resemble risks (i.e. the 
potential for failure) for each myth as opposed to absolute performance.  The reasons for 
taking such an opposing view is to demonstrate that some data, at least, was indicating that 
the Greek crisis was coming.  Although the magnitude and the reach of the crisis was to say 
the least unimaginable before 2009, it was nonetheless to be anticipated, even if in another, 
less significant form that it is at present. 
In our empirical research we compare the following Mediterranean countries: Portugal, 
Italy, Greece, Spain and Ireland; many of our readers may also notice that these countries are 
used to often form a controversial acronym, used in such comparisons.  We choose these 
countries  mainly  because  they  are  a  favourite  comparison  group  among  many  leading 
economists and experts discussing the Greek crisis and its consequences.  Another important 
reason for choosing this group is because in 2010 and early 2011 the problems of the Greek 
economy appeared to be contagious.  Spain and Portugal in particular have been frequently 
compared to Greece, but Italy and Ireland as well.  Portugal and Ireland have also taken a 
profound  economic  aid  in  order  to  deal  with  their  own  debt  crises.  When  available  and 
relevant we also use data for Turkey. We now proceed to discuss the Greek Crisis myths. 
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The Greek crisis has been the sole outcome of failed economic policies 
Wish it were true; In reality this is composite myth but there is evidence showing that 
Greece’s  problems  are  more  far  reaching  than  poor  fiscal  policy.    Institutions  and  their 
functioning play a major role in the effectiveness and implementation of each fiscal policy, 
and there are at least two indicators showing that Greece’s institutions were below par from 
their counterparts. For instance in Table 1 we look at the ‘Transposition of Community Law’ 
for our selected countries.   
Table 1 Transposition of Community Law; Eu-15 & Selected Countries [Source: Eurostat, 2011a] 
  Transposition of Community law (%)  Group  Better or Worse than EU-15 Average? 
Year  Greece  Spain  Portugal Ireland Italy 
EU-
15  AVG  +/-  Greece Spain  Portugal Ireland Italy 
2000  90,9  95,6  92,7  93  92,9  93,8 93,02 -0,78  -2,9  1,8  -1,1  -0,8  -0,9 
2001  96  97,9  96,2  96,9  96,8  96,7 96,76  0,06  -0,7  1,2  -0,5  0,2  0,1 
2002  94,7  96,3  94,9  94,9  95,2  95,5  95,2  -0,3  -0,8  0,8  -0,6  -0,6  -0,3 
2003  97,1  99,1  98,1  98,6  97,5  98 98,08  0,08  -0,9  1,1  0,1  0,6  -0,5 
2004  96,4  99,1  97,5  98  96,4  98 97,48 -0,52  -1,6  1,1  -0,5  0  -1,6 
2005  97,4  98,9  97,8  98,7  97,7  98,7  98,1  -0,6  -1,3  0,2  -0,9  0  -1 
2006  97,7  99  97,6  99,3  97,9  98,9  98,3  -0,6  -1,2  0,1  -1,3  0,4  -1 
2007  98,3  99,1  98,7  99,4  98,9  99,2 98,88 -0,32  -0,9  -0,1  -0,5  0,2  -0,3 
2008  97,1  98,3  97,3  98,3  97,8  98,3 97,76 -0,54  -1,2  0  -1  0  -0,5 
2009  97,7  98,9  98,4  98,4  97,8  98,6 98,24 -0,36  -0,9  0,3  -0,2  -0,2  -0,8 
               -0,39  -1,24  0,65  -0,65  -0,02  -0,68 
                Freq 100,0% 10,0%  90,0%  30,0% 90,0% 
In our tabulation we try to compare the selected countries to the EU-15 Average as a 
benchmark, both in terms of frequency and relevant performance.  Our reader will notice that 
Greece is a very consistent underperformer in relation to the other members of the particular 
group. All the same, the main point of the transposition of Community law is that Greece is 
lagging behind, consistently and often significantly, in terms of ‘Europeanising’ itself.  While 
not all of the community law is necessarily directly related to fiscal effectiveness, it is easily 
seen that Greece lag appears to be systemic, and it shows that the institutional trinity of law 
making, judicial system, and government is not really as fine-tuned as in other countries. Italy 
is a close second together with Portugal, but Ireland and especially Spain are good performers 
and are consistently transposing national law to the European requirements.    
Greece has been characterized by political stability 
Most  Governments,  in  most  countries,  tend  to  serve  their  term  unless  exceptional 
political or other circumstances force them to step down. However with the exception of Italy 
perhaps,  Government  stability  is  taken  for  granted  in  most  cases.  In  Greece  however  the 
Government stability is more or less an illusion.  The regular term for an elected Government 
in Greece is 4 years; That would imply that since democracy was restored in 1974, Greek 
should now have its 10
th Government (2011-1974=37yrs 37÷4=9).  The truth is that Greece is 
now in its 17
th Government i.e. nearly 1,7 times as many governments as would have been The [Greek] crisis that should have been avoided 
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expected if in complete 4-year terms. This is before taking into  account multiple cabinet 
shuffles during some terms and the frequent ruling party shifts.  
In fact, the high-level are like in Table 2:  
Table 2 High Level Greek Government Statistics 
Statistic  Measurement 
(*) 
Average  term  duration  (Completed  terms,  incl.  coalition 
Cabinets): 
2,16 years 
Average term duration (Completed terms, Single party only):  2,86 years 
Conservative Party:  7 times 
Socialist Party:  7 times 
Successions (Con-Soc or Soc-Con)  4 times 
Coalition Government:  3 times 
 
(*)Based on data available by The General Secretariat of the Government, 2011 
We termed these statistics ‘high Level’ because if one considers cabinet shuffles and the 
pre-election times (where no policy-related decision making is allowed to take place) the 
figures become much worse; the average government duration drops below the 2yrs mark 
(instead of the normative 4 years), before even taking into account partisan successions (i.e. 
as policy shift indicators), or local government results and their potential effect on the central 
government.   
In other words, political stability only exists on paper; the practice it is not really there.  
Political leadership maintains policy continuity and sustainability 
Counting  government  term  durations  also  lead  us  to  look  at  other  ways  in  which 
political (in)stability may unfold itself.   
While the root causes for this type of instability may be numerous and hard to pinpoint 
exhaustively, we note one of the most prominent ones. The election law has been changing 
almost as swiftly as the Greek governments.  In particular the election system has changed six 
(6) times since the first election law and the establishment of democracy in 1974 (Table 3). 
Table 3 Shifts in the Government election system 
Law Reference  Change No. 
Electoral Law Presidential Decree 
65/1974 
0 – Starting 
Point. 
Electoral Law 626/1977  1 
Electoral Law P.D. 895/1981  2 
Electoral Law 1516/1985  3 
Electoral Law 1847/1989  4 
Electoral Law 1907/1990  5 
Electoral Law 3231/2004  6 
Of course one could argue that in a ‘healthy’ Democracy, politicians always strive to 
improve upon a representative system of democracy, and we could not agree more with such Nikitas-Spiros KOUTSOUKIS, Spyros ROUKANAS 
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an  observation.  In  fact,  table  5  only  shows  exactly  that;  the  inherent  faults  of  the 
representative democracy do not allow the Greek politicians to get their republic’s election 
law right in the first place. A closer look at the different election laws is likely to unveil that 
with each succession the law affects more significantly the parliament seats of the first and 
second party and less so the characteristics of the seat representation beyond the first two, as 
most election results show.   
All  these  numbers  indicate  a  high  degree  of  instability  in  the  most  important 
development drivers of all: Governance and Leadership. Poor public financial performance 
becomes less of a surprise all of a sudden.  
A strategic vision for the country’s development is being shared among ruling parties 
According to Marc Roche, in 1999 the Greek Government asked from Goldman Sachs 
to find ways to help hide part of Greek deficit. The “solution” appeared to be to keep military 
expenditures from being recorded in public expenditures. In addition Goldman Sachs also 
used  Credit  Default  Swaps  and  helped  the  Greek  Government  to  protect  their  debt  from 
exchange fluctuations. Roche goes further to argue that Goldman Sachs succeeded (Roche, 
2011).  The  story  continues;  as  the  European  Commission  notes,  successive  Greek 
governments from alternate political parties repeatedly revised the public finances figures. 
This happened twice in the last decade, and in particular in 2004 (socialist to conservative 
succession) and in 2009 (conservative to socialist succession).   
Looking ate this ‘interplay’ between the ruling parties each time one came to power,  
implies  directly  that  Greece’s  public  finance  monitoring  system  was  largely  a  matter  of 
partisan interpretation as opposed to a standardised approach of tidy book-keeping as one 
would  expect  from  a  reliable,  responsible,  Euro  state.  We  simply  quote  the  European 
Commission’s view on this matter:   
“…  In  both  cases,  in  the  aftermath  of  political  elections,  substantial 
revisions took  place revealing a practice of widespread misreporting, in an 
environment  in  which  checks  and  balances  appear  absent,  information 
opaque  and  distorted,  and  institutions  weak  and  poorly  coordinated.” 
(European Commission, 2010b, p.20) 
  This is the gist of the now infamous “Greek Statistics” approach.   
We contrast this with the General Government debt and deficit figures for the past 15 
years or so. The figures are again self explanatory (Table 4).  
Table 4 Greek Government Debt & Deficit 
[Sources: Eurostat, 2011b and Eurostat 2011c] 
Years  General  Government  Debt  
(% of GDP) 
General  Government  Deficit  
(% of GDP) 
1995  97.0  - 
1996  99.4  - 
1997  96.6  - 
1998  94.5  - 
1999  94.0  - 
2000  103.4  -3.7 
2001  103.7  -4.5 
2002  101.7  -4.8 
2003  97.4  -5.6 The [Greek] crisis that should have been avoided 
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2004  98.6  -7.5 
2005  100.0  -5.2 
2006  106.1  -5.7 
2007  105.4  -6.4 
2008  110.7  -9.8 
2009  127.1  -15.4 
2010  142.8  -10.5 
Please note that government debt was declining only in the periods between 1997 and 
1999, and between 2002 and 2003; other than that it has been consistently on the rise; this 
long term trend, presumably, should have raised the alarms long time before 2009. It is also 
notable, that according to Eurostat, Greece never met the 3% deficit yardstick. Or, in other 
words, Greece’s financial performance was never up to par; or so it seems. This is a consistent 
performance, consistently shared and pursued among the interchanging ruling parties.   
The  Greek  people  have  a  shared  vision,  values  and  principles  regarding  competent 
economic and political development 
For  this  myth  we  use  data  from  the  Transparency  International  (TI)  Corruption 
Perceptions index, as tabulated in table 5.  
Table 5 Selected Countries & Turkey Corruption Perception Index Ranks  
[Source: Transparency International, 2010] 
            Group     
Year  Greece  Ireland  Spain  Portugal  Italy  Avg  Greece–
Group  Turkey  Greece - 
Turkey 
1999  36  15  22  21  38  26,4  -9,6  54  18 
2000  35  19  20  23  39  27,2  -7,8  50  15 
2001  42  18  22  25  29  27,2  -14,8  54  12 
2002  44  23  20  25  31  28,6  -15,4  64  20 
2003  50  18  23  25  35  30,2  -19,8  77  27 
2004  49  17  22  27  42  31,4  -17,6  77  28 
2005  47  19  23  26  40  31  -16  65  18 
2006  54  18  23  26  45  33,2  -20,8  60  6 
2007  56  17  25  28  41  33,4  -22,6  64  8 
2008  57  16  28  32  55  37,6  -19,4  58  1 
2009  71  14  32  35  63  43  -28  61  -10 
2010  78  14  30  32  67  44,2  -33,8  56  -22 
Sadly, this is another area where Greece has been steadily making negative progress.  
Keeping in mind that the TI index is based on perceptions as opposed to facts it goes to show 
that the Greeks, as self aware as they may be, have been caught in a bad spin and cannot (?) 
snap out of it (CPI, 2010).  From this perspective however it appears that the ‘true’ Greek 
economy,  in  addition  to  all  the  other  problems  we  have  discussed  thus  far,  is  not  really 
functioning transparently, and in fact transparency is worsening over time.  We are aware that 
the TI index is not representative of the Greek people or of their beliefs; but we do believe it 
is highlighting a significant and universal problem. The Greek performance only shows that Nikitas-Spiros KOUTSOUKIS, Spyros ROUKANAS 
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the  problem  in  Greece  has  gotten  significantly  worse,  and  that  the  Greeks  are  not  really 
effective at stopping this downfall and reducing the problem as much as possible.  
 
3. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Having seen more than a few Greek statistics it is easily seen that the Greek crisis 
appears to be a complex problem; it also appears to be deeply rooted in the fabric of its 
society, implying that the crisis is more than purely economical, and a successful resolution is 
likely to require more than mere austere fiscal policies and public spending cuts.  We note 
that our analysis of the Greek state implies, by and large, problems in institutions and more 
importantly state-level and institutional decision making; in other words the state’s way of 
having processes and quality assurance structures in place.  This institutional and institutional 
functioning deficit is equivalent to the lack of political development in political science terms 
(for instance, Koutsoukis K. 1999).  
So, going back to the Greek situation we proceed to look at some of its most important 
myths: 
The  Greek  crisis  has  been  the  sole  outcome  of  failed  economic  policies.  As  we  have 
demonstrated the failed fiscal policies are but the icing on the cake. In essence the Greek 
crisis is deeply rooted in poorly performing institutions at all levels affecting interactions at 
both the internal and the external environments. 
Greece has been characterized by political stability. As we have shown when considering 
the Governance and Leadership driver, political stability is largely superficial; on average the 
Greek governments barely complete half a term in office.   
Political  leadership  maintains  policy  continuity  and  sustainability.  The  polarisation 
between the ruling parties in the past few decades has been the dominant force behind the 
variable election system and the frequent revisiting of the financial performance reporting 
system, known as “Greek statistics.” 
A strategic vision for the country’s development is being shared among ruling parties. 
More or less it follows from the previous two myths that the shared development vision has 
fallen victim to partisan polarisation.   
Our analysis lends itself well as an explanatory device in the case of the Greek crisis. If the 
Greek governments had been prudent enough to look at these figures at least, they would have 
noticed that the situation was worsening slowly but surely. Thus, this is one crisis that could 
have,  and  should  have  been  avoided  –  the  first  step  in  effective  crisis  management 
(Augustine, 1995).  
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